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Understanding sustainability in a broader sense, as relating to the nature and quality of 
economic growth, and drawing on the recent literature on the fundamental determinants of 
growth, this paper looks at the achievements and prospects of the internal sustainability of 
Arab countries.  The countries are classified in four broad categories depending on their 
production structure.  The relevant indicators for sustainability used in the paper are:  the 
level of pre capita income; inequality in the distribution of income and poverty; economic 
structure; investment; institutions; and, technological capacity.  
The evidence shows that the Arab countries are relatively well positioned regarding the 
distribution of income, the incidence of poverty, human development and investment rates.   
However, given the definition of an ideal growth and development society, and given the 
scientific and technological nature of the twenty first century, it is shown that the Arab 
countries lack conspicuously in the areas of institutions and technological capacity. These, 
together with a currently distorted production structure, present Arab policy makers with 




The Arab states as a group are popularly referred to as the “Arab World”. The term “Arab 
World” is a political designation rather than an economic grouping, despite the fact that 
economic integration, and unity, has always been an inspiration of various political 
movements in the region. As a political grouping the term finds its expression in the League 
of Arab States (LAS) that was established in 1945. In the context of LAS, which is modelled 
on the UN organizational structure, a lot of perceived economic aspirations of ordinary Arabs 
are expressed and articulated, but not necessarily implemented. Due to various historical 
reasons the Arab countries have failed to use the LAS framework to forge an economic 
integration scheme that could have distinguished them as a distinct economic group. 
 
Perhaps one of the reasons why the Arab economic group did not materialize is the fact that 
the Arab World is characterized by a lot of economic diversity. To highlight this economic 
diversity it may be useful to follow the Economic Research Forum (ERF: 1998) and group 
the Arab countries into four broad categories: mixed oil producers (MOP) including Algeria, 
Libya and Iraq; Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and UAE; diversified economies (DE) including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Tunisia; and, primary producers (PP) including Comoros, Mauritania,   3 
Sudan, Djibouti and Yemen
1. In 1998 the total population of the Arab World is estimated as 
258 million (4.4% of the population of the world). It is with the sustainability and economic 
growth potential of this group of countries that this paper is concerned.  
 
The question of sustainability has recently been associated with environmental management. 
According to the famous Brundtland Commission sustainable development is defined as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”. As rightly pointed out by Haq (1995: 78) such a 
definition begs more questions than it answers. He argues, correctly, that what needs to be 
sustained is human life and that sustaining the physical environment is a means, not an end, 
to sustaining human life. Formulating an operational framework for sustainable human 
development he argues that if the basic “concept is sustainable human development, each 
generation must meet its needs without incurring debts it cannot repay. That means avoiding 
the accumulation of environmental debts (by polluting or exhausting natural resources) as 
well as financial debts (through unsustainable borrowing), social debts (by neglecting to 
invest in human development) and demographic debts (by permitting unchecked population 
growth and urbanization). All these debts rob our children”. 
 
On the basis of the above broader view of sustainability, the concept of sustainable 
development “would immediately focus on the nature and quality of economic growth and 
avoid the sterile debate over zero growth. Growth is essential, but sustainable development 
requires that it be different. It must become more respectful of the physical environment. And 
it must translate into human lives”. On such an understanding, therefore, the issue of the 
sustainability and growth of Arab countries are closely linked and can be looked at by 
considering the major propositions of the theory of economic growth regarding the major 
factors explaining long-run economic performance of countries. In this respect we note that 
modern empirical growth theory (see, for example, Romer 1986; Lucas 1988; Barro 1997; 
Sala-i-Martin 1997) has identified at least sixty-two statistically significant explanatory 
variables influencing the growth performance of different economies. Of these sixty-two, 
three explanatory variables have consistently been reported as significant in all studies. These 
three variables are in the nature of initial conditions. They include initial real per capita 
income (reflecting the stage of development of the country and capturing the idea of 
convergence over long periods of time); initial life expectancy at birth (reflecting the health 
dimension of the human capital of the country); and initial primary school enrolment ratio 
(reflecting the education dimension of human capital).  
 
A recent rigorous robustness analysis conducted on the remaining 59 variables, and taking 
account of the above three initial conditions, found only 22 variables to be robustly 
significant in explaining differences in growth performance between countries (Sala-i-Martin 
1997). Seventeen of these are deemed relevant and can be grouped into six broad categories 
of regional, political, market distortions, investment, production structure, and openness 
                                                 
1 The classification of Comoros, Libya and Djbouti is not that clean. Palastine is not 
included for obvious conceptual reasons; though in some documents the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip is included as an Arab economy.    4 
(trade policy) variables. Another variable that has come out as an important explanatory 
variable is colonial experience. 
 
The most important qualitative results of this literature can be summarized as follows. (a) 
There are three regional variables, two of which are regional dummies for Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and both of which are negatively related to growth. The third is an 
“absolute latitude” variable, which shows that the farther away from the equator a country is, 
the better is its growth performance. (b) The political variables are six: the “rule of law”, 
“political rights” and “civil liberties” (positively related to growth); the “number of 
revolutions”, “military coups” and “war” (negatively related to growth). (c) The market 
distortions and economic organisation category include two market distortion variables, both 
of which are bad for growth. These are the “real exchange rate distortions” and “the standard 
deviation of the black market premium”. The third variable, “degree of capitalism”, is 
positively related to growth. (d) The investment variables include “equipment investment” 
and “non-equipment investment”, both of which are positively related to growth. It is 
reported, however, that the influence of non-equipment investment on growth is only about 
one-fourth that of equipment investment. (e) There are two production structure variables: the 
“fraction of primary products in total exports”, negatively related to growth, and “the fraction 
of GDP in mining”, positively related to growth. (f) An openness variable reflects trade 
policy and includes one variable, “the number of years an economy has been open between 
1950 and 1990”, which is positively related to growth. 
 
Given the established methodology of cross-country regressions of growth performance, it is 
perhaps important to note that out of these 17 robustly significant variables, the three 
variables of the “regional group” and colonial experience are exogenous in nature. Of the 
remaining 13 variables, ten are in the nature of initial conditions: the six variables of the 
“political group”, the two investment variables, and the two variables of the “production 
structure” group. The remaining variables are policy related. We hasten to note at this 
juncture that the above analysis has shown that a number of conventional variables perceived 
to be important did not survive the robustness test. These include such variables as “various 
measures of government spending”, “various measures of financial sophistication”, “the 
inflation rate or its variance”, “various measures of scale such as total area or total labour 
force”, “outward orientation”, “tariff restrictions”, “the black market premium” and “the 
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation”. Obviously, a large number of these are policy variables 
and some of them are formulated in such a way as to have a non-linear relationship to growth 
and as such were not adequately captured by the analysis.  
 
Consistent with the above analysis it has recently been argued that the fundamentals for long-
run growth are investment in physical capital and human resources. “These are, in turn, made 
possible by physical infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, the rule of law and solid 
institutions. The role of trade policy in economic growth is largely auxiliary and of an 
enabling nature: extremes of export taxation and import restrictions can surely suffocate 
nascent economic activity, but an open trade regime on its own will not set an economy on a 
sustained growth path” (Rodrik 1999:105).   5 
Further, a recent set of theoretical literature argues that greater initial inequality in the 
distribution of income and wealth is likely to be detrimental to long-run growth. One 
theoretical explanation for this is couched in terms of the consequences of imperfect capital 
markets on agents’ investment behaviour resulting in lower productivity and efficiency 
losses. Under this theoretical construct, the poor are seen as being credit constrained to 
pursue investment in education and hence in human capital formation. Similarly, political 
economy models have shown that initial inequality is likely to increase voter support for 
inefficient redistributive policies resulting in efficiency losses and lower growth. In this 
respect it is also important to note that from a long-run development and transformation 
perspective, determining the initial inequality levels would depend on which side of the 
inequality-development relation (the well known Kuznets curve) an economy finds itself (see 
Kuznets (1955)). As is well known, the Kuznets curve is a long-run relationship between the 
level of development and inequality, which shows that at initial stages of development, 
inequality will tend to rise before it declines. Despite a lot of controversy surrounding the 
existence of this relationship recent empirical work, using high quality data sets, has 
confirmed its existence (see, for example, Ali and Elbadawi 1999; Barro 1999). 
 
From the above, rather brief and selective, review of the recent advances in the literature on 
the fundamental determinants of long-run growth, it is perhaps clear that there is a core set of 
initial conditions that is likely to determine the growth performance of Arab countries and 
hence their sustainability. Given the wide multiplicity of what constitutes initial conditions 
and the diversity of the region, we identify income and its growth (section 2), inequality and 
poverty (section 3), economic structure (section 4), investment (section 5), institutions 
(section 6), and technological capacity (section 7) as the most critical set of variables for the 
internal sustainability of the Arab states. The paper concludes by offering some final remarks 
(section 9). 
 
II. Income Levels and Income Growth: 
Initial income refers to the level of income, however measured, that obtains at some reference 
point in time. Due to data limitations we look at the level of income in 1998, the latest year 
for which reliable region-wide GDP data are available. We hasten to note that by looking at 
the level of income of the region the point of departure here is that such an investigation will 
enable us to appropriately appreciate the position of the region compared to the world. Table 
(1) below provides a summary of the distribution of population and income in the Arab world 
among the four sub-groups of the region.  
 
Table (1): Income and Population of Arab Countries :1998 
 
Country  GDP 
 
Population 
(million)  Current Prices (billion US$) 
Per Capita 
(US$) 
MOP  52.3   (20.3)  124.8   (21.2)  2386 
GCC  29.3   (11.4)  231.5   (39.4)  7901 
DE  118.0   (45.8)  162.5   (27.7)  1377 
PP  57.8   (22.5)  68.7   (11.7)  1189 
Arab Countries (Total or Average)  257.4 (100.0)  587.5 (100.0)  2282 
S. Deviation  15.4  33.5  5223.4 
Source: Own compilation from ERF (2000).   6 
Consider first the income of the region. In 1998 the Arab world produced goods and services 
worth US$587.5 billion at current prices. This amounts to a per capita income of US$ 2282 
per annum or US$190 per month. This average hides significant variations among countries 
and sub-groups. At the country level, per capita GDP varies between a high of US$ 17222 
(nearly US$1435 per month) for United Arab Emirates to a low of US$325 (or about US$ 27 
per month) for Yemen. At the sub-regional level, the highest GDP is recorded for GCC at 
US$ 231.5 billion and a per capita income of US$ 7901, followed by that of MOP with a 
GDP of US$ 124.8 billion and a per capita income of US$ 2386. DE ranks third with a GDP 
of US$ 162.5 billion and a per capita income of US$1377, while PP has the lowest GDP at 
US$ 68.7 billion and a per capita income of US$ 1189. Thus the table confirms the diversity 
of the Arab world in terms of both the level of total income and the level of per capita 
income, a diversity captured by international classification of the various countries of the 
region such as the classification adopted by the World Bank in terms of low-income, middle 
income and high income groups.  
 
To properly appreciate the economic size of the Arab world in the world economy a 
comparison with a set of selected countries is undertaken. Available information shows that 
Spain, with a population of 39 million, has a GDP of US$ 552 billion nearly equal to that of 
the Arab world, while Italy’s 58 million people have a GDP 0f US$ 1171, nearly twice that of 
the Arab region. The 9 million Swedes produce goods and services worth US$227 billion 
nearly three times more than the 58 million people of the Arab primary producers. Finally, 
the 46 million South Koreans produce a GDP of US$ 298 billion twice as much as the 52 
million Arabs of the mixed oil producers.. 
 
Further comparisons are also worth noting. Thus, for example, the GDP of the Arab world 
contrasts very unflatteringly with the value of the goods and services produced by  the largest 
multinational corporations in the world. Available information shows that the four largest 
multinationals in the world in terms of sales revenue (General Motors, Ford Motor Company, 
Mitsui & Company, Royal Dutch/Shell) had a total revenue of US$ 593 billion in 1997 more 
than the GDP of the Arab world. The sixth ranked company (Itochu Corporation of Japan) 
had sales revenue of US$118 billion in 1997, greater than the GDP of the eight primary 
producers of the Arab economies of US$ 68.7 billion (UNCTAD, 1999). Thus, despite its oil 
wealth, and its population share of 4.4% in world population, the Arab world could be seen as 
a marginal grouping in the context of the world economy.   
 
Having noted the above, we now turn to look at the growth performance of this group of 
countries. In this respect we note that it is now generally accepted that the post-war period up 
until 1973 was the golden era for economic growth in the world. The Arab economies shared 
in this growth, where some of the countries experienced unprecedented rates of economic 
expansion. In historical perspective, the year 1973 marks the first oil price shock, which 
unleashed an era of massive economic dislocation for non-oil exporting developing countries. 
 
For a sample of 50 developing countries, for which data is available, it is shown that per 
capita incomes increased at annual rates in excess of 2.1 per cent over the period 1960-1973. 
There were no fewer than 42 developing countries whose economies grew at rates exceeding   7 
2.5 per cent per capita per annum. For these countries per capita income could have doubled 
in about 28 years. The sample included 4 Arab countries, Oman, Mauritania, Egypt and Iraq. 
Oman topped the list of the fastest growing developing countries, with a per capita GDP 
growth of 10.5 over the period 1960-1973 (see Rodrik 1999: 68-71). Per capita growth rates 
for Mauritania (2.9%; with a doubling time of about 24 years), Egypt (2.7%; with a doubling 
time of about 26 years) and Iraq (2.6%; with a doubling time of about 27 years) were quite 
respectable.   
 
Following Rodrik’s 1973 periodization, we compiled the evidence for various samples of 
Arab countries for which data is available over the period 1960-1998. As table (2) shows, 
over the period 1960-1973 the sample included ten countries. Two Arab countries 
experienced fast growth where per capita income increased by an average rate in excess of 5 
per cent per annum. This sub-sample of fast growers included Oman and Saudi Arabia with 
per capita income growth rates of 13.6 per cent and 7.65 respectively. In addition, three 
countries recorded growth rates in excess of 2.5 per cent but less than 5 per cent. These 
included Tunisia (4.26 per cent) and Syrian Arab Republic and Mauritania both recording per 
capita growth rates of 3.05 per cent. Two countries recorded negative per capita growth: 
Kuwait (-4.47 per cent) and Sudan (-1.18 per cent). The overall growth rate of the Arab 
countries averaged 2.60 per cent with a standard deviation of 4.83 percentage points.  
 
Table (2): Distribution of Arab countries on the Basis of Real Per Capita 
Growth Rates (Number of Countries) 
 
Range of Real Per Capita Growth 









Above  5.0  2 3 1 1 
2.5-5.0  3 3 1 3 
1.5-2.5  3 1 2 2 
0.5-1.5  0 1 3 3 
0.0-0.5  0 0 2 0 
Below  0.0  2 4 6 6 
Total # of Countries   10  12  15  15 
Average Growth Rate  (Per cent)  2.6 -0.3  -0.09  0.59 
Standard Deviation (Percentage Points)  4.83 4.30 2.63 3.07 
Source: Computed from World Bank (2000) 
World Bank (2000), World Development Indicators on CD-ROM 
 
Following 1973, however, the dismal growth performance decades started. Despite the 
various attempts at explaining this dismal performance, it is generally accepted that the 
turbulence that beset the world economy following 1973 was the major dislocating factor.   8 
According to Rodrik (1999) the turbulence included the abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates, two major oil shocks, other commodity boom and bust cycles 
and the interest shock of the 1980s. In the wake of these and other shocks, out of 12 Arab 
countries for which the data is available, the period 1974-1984 saw three Arab countries with 
per capita growth rate in excess of 5 per cent. Of the two fastest growing Arab economies 
during the period prior to 1973, it was only Oman with the real per capita income growth rate 
of 6.17 per cent that maintained its performance over the period 1974-1984. The other fast 
growers over this period were Jordan (7.25 per cent) and Egypt (5.45 per cent). The 
distribution of countries in table (2)shows that the number of Arab countries that grew in 
excess of 2.5 per cent but less than 5 per cent remained the same though only two countries 
maintained the same range of growth rate  over this and the previous periods: Syria and 
Tunisia. However, the number of Arab countries that grew in excess of 1.5 per cent but less 
than 2.5 per cent declined from three to one.  It was Morocco that registered real per capita 
growth rate of 2.32 per cent for the 1974-1984 period as compared to 1.93 per cent of the 
period prior to 1973. At the other extreme, the number of Arab countries that registered 
negative growth increased from 2 to 4. The overall growth of the region averaged only 
negative 0.30 per cent with a standard deviation of 4.30 percentage points.  
 
For a sample of 15 Arab countries over the period 1985-1994, only Kuwait distinguished 
itself as a fast grower with an average growth rate of per capita income of 6.03 per cent per 
annum. The number of countries growing at negative rates during the 1985-94 decade 
increased to 6: United Arab Emirates (-3.96 per cent), Algeria (-2.22 per cent), Saudi Arabia 
(-1.52 per cent), Comoros (-1.48 per cent), Jordan (-1.39 per cent) and Mauritania (-1.15 per 
cent). The overall growth of the region was negative 0.09 per cent with a standard deviation 
of 2.63 percentage points.  
 
As is now generally acknowledged, the second half of the 1990s witnessed a rather hesitant 
economic recovery in the region. Table (2) records that the number of countries growing in 
excess of 2.5 per cent but less than 5 per cent increased from one to three while the number of 
countries that registered positive growth rate but less than 0.5 per cent decreased from two to 
zero in the 1995-1998 period. It was only Sudan that distinguished itself as the fastest 
growing Arab country over this period as compared to 0.12 per cent growth rate it registered 
in the previous period. The number of countries that registered negative growth rate during 
this period also remained six of which four were carried forward from the previous period: 
Comoros, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Jordan. The overall growth of the region 
rebounded to positive levels averaging 0.59 per cent with a standard deviation of 3.07 
percentage points
2.   
 
The cumulative effect of all the above growth patterns is that at the end of 1998 there were 3 
Arab countries, out of a sample of 9 countries, with real per capita incomes less than that of 
1973. The per capita income deficit varies between countries. The ratio of 1998 per capita 
income to that of 1973 is less than 50 per cent in the United Arab Emirates (38 per cent). A 
ratio greater than 50 per cent but less than 90 per cent is recorded for Saudi Arabia (67 per 
                                                 
2 Similar results, using decadal averages, see Makdisi et al (2000). They also note the relatively high volatility of 
growth in the region.    9 
cent) and Mauritania (88 per cent). The remaining countries have a ratio of 100 per cent or 
more: Algeria (111 per cent), Egypt (238 per cent), Morocco (157 per cent), Syria and 
Tunisia (185 per cent) and Sudan (151 per cent). At the end of 1998 the average real per 
capita income in the region (measured in 1995 constant prices) amounted to $1981 (with a 
standard deviation of $4247) compared to $1710 in 1973 (with a standard deviation of 
$14173).  
 
An interesting question at this juncture is what would have happened to the level of income if 
the pre-1973 growth rates were maintained during the post 1973 period. If each country were 
able to maintain its 1960-1973 per capita growth rate over the past 25 years, the average per 
capita income of the region would have been $3248. Countries, of course, would have 
performed differently given their initial growth rates, but averaging over countries it can be 
shown that the real cost to the region of low growth over the period 1973-1994 amounted to 
$285.3 billion at the end of 1998.  
 
 
III. Income Inequality and Poverty: 
As is well known, the most widely used measure of inequality in the distribution of income is 
the Gini coefficient. This measure varies from zero (where every person in the society has the 
same income, indicating the absence of inequality and representing conditions of perfect 
equality) to unity (where one person gets all the income and the rest receive nothing, 
indicating the presence of complete inequality). The Gini co-efficient is frequently expressed 
in percentages, for ease of understanding. Other measures of inequality are income shares, 
where, in the case of complete equality, population shares would earn equal income shares.  
 
Using the Gini coefficient, and based on the most recent available high quality data, table (3) 
reports a comparison among world regions. The table shows that the Arab countries, as a 
group, rank second to Asia in terms of lower inequality. This is reflected in a Gini coefficient 
for the distribution of consumption expenditure of about 39% compared to one of 37% for 
Asia. Latin America, with a Gini coefficient for the distribution of income of 50% ranks as 
the highest inequality region in the world. We hasten to note that such comparison has to 
acknowledge the fact that for regions, except Latin America, the Gini coefficients are based 
on consumption expenditure rather than income. In this respect it is known that the 
distribution of expenditure is generally more equal than the distribution of income. Indeed 
Deininger and Squire (1996) advise researchers to adjust their expenditure based Gini 
coefficients by 6.6 percentage points to make them comparable to those based on income. 
Making such an adjustment only changes the ranking of Africa, to become the most unequal 
region, and Latin America, to become the second most unequal among world regions. 
Additionally, however, making the adjustment the Gini coefficient of the distribution of 
income in the Arab countries becomes 46%, which reflects a fairly high degree of inequality 
in the distribution of income. 
 
As noted above, the state of distribution can be looked at in terms of expenditure or income 
shares accruing to various population groups. Detailed information shows that in Asia the 
richest 20 per cent of the population receive about 40 per cent of total expenditure while the   10 
poorest 20 per cent of the population receive only 9 per cent of total expenditure. At the other 
extreme is Africa where the richest 20 per cent of the African population receive 51 per cent 
of total expenditure, while the poorest 20 per cent receive only 5 per cent. In the Arab region, 
with an expenditure Gini coefficient of 38 per cent, the richest 20 per cent of the Arab 
population receive 45 per cent of total income, while the poorest 20 percent of the population 
receive only 6.7 per cent. Further, the share of the lowest 40 per cent of the population is only 
17.69 per cent of total expenditure implying a shortfall of 22.31 per cent of total income, 
while the mean share of the top 20 per cent of the population is about 45 per cent, with 25 per 
cent of total expenditure accruing to this group as a bonus. The share of the top 20 per cent in 
total expenditure is about 7 times that of the poorest 20 per cent of the population.  
 
 
Table ( 3): Income Distribution in Arab the Countries and World Regions in the 1990s 
(percentages) 
 
Region  Number of Countries  Gini Coefficient 
Arab Countries  6  38.95 (3.61) 
Africa 18  48.00  (10.1) 
Asia  8  37.03  (7.2) 
Latin America  16  50.38  (6.7) 
All Countries  48  45.83  (9.4) 
Source: Ali and Elbadawi (2000: 12). Figures between brackets are standard deviations. 
 
 
The above relatively high inequality levels are not changing over time. Thus, in line with 
recent results showing that, in general, income inequality does not display a time trend, few 
of the Arab countries have experienced insignificant changes in the distribution of income 
over fairly long periods of time. In this respect a quantitatively small time trend is defined as 
an annual change of less than 1 per cent of the country’s reference Gini coefficient. A sample 
of four Arab countries, for which data is available shows quantitatively insignificant changes 
in the Gini coefficient over relatively long periods of time. 
 
None of the four countries recorded a quantitatively important decline in expenditure 
inequality over a maximum period of thirty-one years. The largest decline of 10 percentage 
points in the Gini coefficient is recorded for Egypt over a period of 31 years at a low annual 
rate of decline of 0.85 per cent. Jordan and Tunisia recorded a quantitatively insignificant 
decline in expenditure inequality over a relatively long period of time. The increase of 0.01 
percentage points in  inequality over a seven years period is recorded for Morocco with an 
annual rate of increase of the Gini coefficient of 0.004 per cent.  
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Table (4): Quantitative Changes in the Distribution of Income for a Sample of Arab 
Countries  
[Gini Coefficients are in Percentages] 
 
Country  Gini (1st Year)  Gini (2nd Year)  Change in Gini 
(Percentage 
Points) 
Annual Rate of 
Change in Gini 
(per cent) 
Egypt  42.0 (1959)  32.0 (1991)  -10.00  -0.85 
Jordan  40.8 (1980)  40.7 (1991)  -0.10  -0.02 
Morocco  39.19 (1984)  39.2 (1991)  0.01  0.004 
Tunisia  42.3 (1965)  40.24 (1990)  -2.06  -0.20 
Source: Deninger and Squire (1998).  
 
 
In summary, income inequality in the Arab countries is relatively high. This relatively high 
inequality, however, does not seem to be changing over fairly long periods of time. These are 
important features in the distribution of expenditure and income especially from the 
perspective of the dominant analytical framework for the analysis of poverty. As is well 
known the dominant framework for poverty analysis is the money metric approach. Given a 
distribution of income this approach relies on constructing a relevant poverty line to identify 
the poor in society. The two major methods of constructing poverty lines are the food energy 
intake method and the cost of basic needs method. Both are based on the food energy intake 
required to lead a healthy life in a social context.  
 
The dominant approach uses three standard measures of poverty. These are the head-count 
ratio, which gives the number of the poor as a ratio of total population in society, and reflects 
the incidence and spread of poverty in society; the poverty-gap ratio, which is defined as the 
gap between the average income of the poor and the poverty line appropriately weighted by 
the head-count ratio, and reflects the depth of poverty; and, the squared poverty-gap ratio, 
which is a weighted poverty-gap with weights reflecting concern for the poor in society, and 
reflects the severity of poverty. The head-count ratio is the most widely used and understood 
measure of poverty.        
 
Table (5) reports a summary of the state of poverty in the Arab countries based on a sample 
of countries for which high quality data is available. Once again the table gives a comparative 
picture with other regions of the world. 
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Table (5): Poverty Measures in the Arab Countries and World Regions: 
 
















Arab Countries  6  115.3  (45.1)  50.8 (13.7)  21.52 (8.8)  6.51 (5.83)  3.38 (4.91) 
Africa  18  75.0   (70.4)  41.9 (24.2)  52.10 (13.8)  23.4   (8.1)  13.2   (5.9) 
Asia  8  97.7   (45.6)  45.8 (13.4)  24.72 (12.2)  6.99   (4.3)  2.95   (2.0) 
Latin America  16  172.7 (82.0)  73.6 (32.7)  34.83 (8.6)  14.40 (5.0)  7.94   (3.6) 
All Countries  48  109.1 (78.6)  52.0 (27.8)  37.96 (16.3)  15.42 (9.1)  8.51   (6.1) 
Source: Ali and Elbadawi (2000: 12). * Per person per month. 
 
According to the results reported in table (5), about 22 per cent of the Arab population were 
living below a real poverty line, measured in terms of purchasing power parity prices (PPP), 
of $ 56 per person per month. That implies that almost a quarter of the Arab people cannot 
afford to spend this amount of money to provide themselves with bare necessities. The 
average actual expenditure of those who fall below the real poverty line is calculated as $35.4 
per person per month. Compared to other regions, however, the Arab countries boast the 




The above results, on poverty in the Arab world, are confirmed by the results of UNDP’s 
(2000) human development indicator (HDI) and the human poverty index (HPI). As is well 
known HDI is a composite indicator based on longevity (as measured by life expectancy at 
birth), educational attainment (as measured by a combination of the adult literacy rate and the 
combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios), and the standard of living 
(as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity). For each of these sub-indicators 
maximum and minimum values are determined and the sub-indicator is calculated 
accordingly. HDI ranges from unity (for highest human development achievement) to zero 
(for the lowest human development achievement). Countries are then classified into three 
broad groups of high human development (with an HDI in excess of 0.8), medium human 
development (with an HDI more than 0.5 but less than 0.8), and low human development 
(with an HDI less than 0.5). Similarly, the HPI is a composite index that concentrates on 
deprivations in the three aspects of human life already included in the HDI: longevity, 
knowledge, and a decent standard of living. “The first deprivation relates to survival-
vulnerability to death at a relatively early age. The second relates to knowledge- being 
excluded from the world of reading and communication. The third relates to a decent living 
standard in terms of overall provisioning” (UNDP (2000: 272)). The higher the value of the 
index, the higher is the deprivation and hence the higher is the incidence of poverty.  
 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the sample used for the Arab countries is rather limited. Including results pertaining to 
Sudan, and other estimates for Egypt, the incidence of poverty in the region could change substantially given the 
population weights of these two countries. The ranking of the region will also change. See, for example, 
Fergany (1998 and 2000).   13 
According to UNDP (2000) four Arab countries belonged to the high human development 
category (Kuwait, with an HDI of 0.836; Bahrain, 0.82; Qatar, 0.819; and, the United Arab 
Emirates, 0.81). Another four Arab countries belonged to the low human development 
category (Sudan, with an HDI of 0.477; Mauritania, 0.451; Yemen, 0.448; and, Djibouti, 
0.447). The remaining 12 Arab countries belonged to the medium human development 
category. For all the Arab countries the average HDI is 0.635 thus indicating that the region 
belongs to the medium human development category. The distribution of the Arab economic 
groups over the HDI is given in table (6) below. 
 
Table (6): The Human Development Index in the Arab Countries: 1998 
 
Country Group  Number of Countries  Average HDI 
GCC 6  0.794 
MOP 3  0.675 
DE 6  0.672 
PP 5  0.467 
source: UNDP (2000). 
 
HPI is reported for a sample of 85 developing countries including 17 Arab countries. The 
highest HPI value of 64.7% is reported for Niger that ranks 85
th. For the Arab group of 
countries the highest value of 49.7% is recorded for Mauritania which ranks 77
th , followed 
by Yemen (49.4%, ranking 76), Morocco (38.4%, ranking 65
th), Sudan (35.5%, ranking 60), 
Comoros (33%, ranking 57), Iraq (32.9%, ranking 56
th ), and Egypt (32.3%, ranking 55
th ). 
Seven Arab countries recorded HPI less than 20%. These included Jordan (with an HPI of 
8.8%, ranking 7
th ), Bahrain (9.6%, ranking 9
th ), Lebanon (10.8%, ranking 13
th ), Qatar 
(13.7%, ranking 17
th ), Libya (15.3%, ranking 19
th ), UAE (17.9%, ranking 28
th ), and, Syria 
(19.3%, ranking 32). The remaining countries have an HDI in the range 20-30%.      
 
IV. Production Structure: 
Economic structure refers to the relative contribution of the different sectors in the economy 
for production and factor use (see, for example, Robinson and Syrquin 1986). The structure 
of an economy could be looked at from different perspectives, such as the industrial origin of 
goods and services produced, the sources of income and the major occupational activities, the 
distribution of income among the different owners of factors of production, and the structure 
of demand, among others.  
 
Structural transformation is both the process by which the composition of output and the 
contributions of the different sectors to GDP and employment change over time, and the 
forces that generate such a transformation. Studies in the patterns of economic and social 
development have revealed empirical regularities that are summarised as “stylised facts” of 
structural change over time. A recent summary of such “stylised facts” of structural change 
over long periods of time confirms that economies relying on the primary sectors   14 
(agriculture/minerals) in production and employment graduate to ones where manufacturing 
and the service sectors dominate, and that such transformations follow a non-linear pattern 
(Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie 1999). Initially, the employment and GDP shares of agriculture 
and services decline, while those of manufacturing increase. During the intermediate stages, 
the shares of manufacturing and agriculture continue to increase and decrease, respectively. 
In contrast, the shares of the services sector reach their turning points and start to increase. 
These trends continue into later stages of development, within which the shares of 
manufacturing attain their turning points and stabilise.  
 
It is also observed that decreases in output and employment shares do not result from an 
absolute decline in their output. On the contrary, the output of the different sectors will 
continue to increase at an increasing rate and that the decline in their relative share in GDP is 
due to differential growth rates. During the early stages of development, the manufacturing 
industries grow at a much faster rate than agriculture and services as a result of which its 
share both in GDP and employment increases. As the economy advances to higher stages, the 
growth rate of the service sector dominates over the other two.  
 
Over the last four decades, there has been a significant structural shift in the Arab economies, 
broadly consistent with the historically observed development experience of the declining 
share of the agricultural sector. However, the nature and composition of structural 
transformation in the region depict important departures from the general trend, with 
significant implications and repercussions on the internal sustainability and future 
development of the region. The first and most significant deviation relates to the nature of the 
transformation observed in the Arab economies. The share of agriculture in GDP declined 
from 26 per cent during the decade of the 1960s to 18 per cent at the end of the century. 
However, the decrease in the share of agriculture in GDP by 31 per cent was not due to 
significant growth of the industrial sector in general, and those of the manufacturing 
industries in particular. The share of industry increased marginally from 26 per cent to 30 per 
cent of GDP during the intervening decades, while the share of the manufacturing industries 
grew from 9 per cent in the 1960s to 15 per cent at the end of the century. 
 
Table (7): Structure and Structural Transformation of the Arab Economies:1960-1998 
(per cent of GDP) 
 
Category  Agriculture, value added 
(% of GDP) 
Industry, value added 
(% of GDP) 
Services, etc., value added 
(% of GDP) 
  1960-1969  1990-1998  1960-1969  1990-1998  1960-1969  1990-1998 
MOP  12.07 12.33 37.24 47.63 50.69 40.04 
GCC  18.98  2.63  55.27 50.31 25.75 47.06 
DE  21.42 16.55 23.60 28.62 54.98 54.83 
PP  39.04 30.04 28.23 23.44 32.73 46.52 
Average    25.56 17.70 33.38 34.29 41.06 48.02 
S.  Deviation  20.01 17.21 18.47 13.75 15.19 11.05 
Source: Calculated from World Bank (2000), World Development Indicators on CD-ROM 
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The major beneficiary of the decline in agriculture was the service sector, whose share in 
GDP increased from 41 per cent to 48 per cent. This pattern of structural transformation is 
not consistent with the historical observation of moving from agriculture to industry and 
finally to services. The predominance of the service sector in the economies of Arab 
countries at this stage of their development is indicative of a structural problem, which is 
further confirmed by the pattern of sectoral employment.  
 
Table (8): Employment By Sector in 1980 and 1990 (Per cent of total labour force) 
 
Country  Agriculture  Industry  Services 
  1980  1990  1980  1990  1980  1990 
MOP  32.2 21.1 24.3 24.4 43.6 54.5 
GCC  17.8 12.7 28.0 30.4 54.2 56.7 
DE  46.0 33.4 23.0 25.3 42.5 47.5 
PP  59.2 50.9 13.5 15.3 27.4 33.8 
Average  (Unweighted)  40.2 32.0 21.2 23.3 40.7 46.1 
S.  Deviation  27.7 25.9  9.4  10.8 20.9 19.9 
Source: ILO (1999), Key Indicators of Labour Markets 
 
At the end of the century, 32 per cent of the region’s labour force was engaged in agriculture 
while the agriculturally dependent population remains very high. The agricultural dependent 
labour force rises to 42 per cent if the GCC and MOP sub-regions are excluded (table (8)). 
Services are, admittedly, important inputs in the production of commodities and their increase 
in quantity, quality and diversity facilitates resource use and efficiency. But the issue of its 
appropriate size at different levels of development remains unsettled.  
 
Using data from the World Bank and the OECD, Easterly et al (1994) attempt to develop an 
international norm for the appropriate size of services at different levels of development. 
They suggest that service sector shares of 50 per cent and above in GDP are appropriate for 
countries in the middle and upper income countries. This implies that for low-income 
developing countries the size of the service sector should be lower than this level.  
 
Similarly, the regression results of Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1999) imply that the current 
employment and output shares of the services sector (28 percent and 50 percent, respectively) 
correspond to the real per capita income levels of US$2441 and US$4024, respectively.
4 Both 
are significantly higher than the region’s average real per capita of US$1841 in 1998. In 
short, it is safe to conclude that the significant contribution of services to output, the 
relatively high employment share of agriculture, and the limited role of manufacturing in the 
Arab world are not consistent with the stage of development of the region. Rather, they 
reflect to a large measure the distortion in the productive structure of Arab economies as they 
enter the 21
st century. 
                                                 
4 All the regression results in this section refer to those obtained by Kongsamut, Rebelo and Xie (1997).   16 
Finally, it is also instructive to examine the potential speed of productive structural change in 
the Arab region on the basis of the regression results and alternative and actual growth rates. 
The estimated parameters locate the turning point for the employment share of manufacturing 
at the real per capita GDP of US$5224. This level of income can thus be used as criterion to 
determine whether an economy has achieved a relatively mature productive structure.  
 
How quickly will Arab economies achieve this status? Table (9) reports the relevant results 
using the level of per capita GDP of 1998 and the maximum annual average growth rate 
during the 1960-98 period. It is rather disappointing to note that the target income level can 
be achieved in the Arab world after a decade of growth at the rate of 11.25 percent per 
annum – the maximum rate at which real per capita GDP grew during 1961-98 period. The 
outcome is even more troubling if the growth rate is lowered to the average growth rate that 
prevailed during the 1961-98 period. The same dismal picture emerges in relation to the 
performance at the sub-regional and country levels. However, the fact that Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman have achieved the required level of income in 
1965, 1973, 1980 and 1985 respectively show that there is a major role to be played by a 
wealth effect where the discovery, and utilization, of natural resources helps countries to 
jump over various income thresholds .    
 
Table (9): Maximum Growth Performance and Required Number of Years to Achieve 
Manufacturing Sector Maturity 
 
Country/ Region  GDP per capita (1998)  Maximum Growth rate of 
GDP per capita (1960-1998) 
Number of Years required to 
achieve target level of per 
capita GDP of US$5224 
Algeria 1521 0.3162  4 
Egypt 1146  0.1218 13 
Jordan 1491 0.1992  7 
Morocco 1388  0.1029  14 
Syria 1209  0.207  8 
Tunisia 2283 0.1583  6 
Djibouti 742  0.0348  57 
Lebanon 2999  0.3549  2 
Yemen 254  0.025  122 
Mauritania 478  0.2511  11 
Comoros 403  0.0572  46 
Sudan 296  0.2274 14 
Arab 1841  0.1115  10 
Source: Computed from World Bank (2000)  
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Note: Real per capita GDP figures are at 1995 constant US$.The message derived from the 
above is that if Arab countries are to achieve a modern and diversified productive structure, 
they have to grow at rates much higher than those recorded in recent years. The extent of the 
task can be gauged via the same procedure used to obtain the length of time required to 
achieve the target level of real per capita GDP. Two scenarios are built in this manner (table 
(10)). The first envisages the attainment of the target income level within 25 years and 
determines the growth rates required. According to the results, per capita GDP in the Arab 
economy needs to grow by 4.26 per cent annually to realise the desired objective. Except for 
the GCC group, the three other sub-regions need to grow at higher rates. At the country level, 
the required growth rates are much more varied and range from a low of 2.24 percent for 
Lebanon to a high of 12.9 per cent for Yemen.  
 
The second scenario uses the 3.72% growth rate of per capita real GDP required to reduce 
poverty by half by 2015. If all Arab countries manage to grow at that rate the region will 
reach the target income level in 29 years. Again sub-regional and country performances vary.  
 
Table (10): Growth Scenarios and Required Number of Years to Achieve 
Manufacturing Sector Maturity 
 
Country  GDP per capita (1998)  Average Annual Growth 
Rates of Real Per Capita 
GDP Required to Achieve 
Manufacturing Maturity 
in 25 Years* (%) 
Required Number of 
Years** 
Algeria 1521  5.06  34 
Egypt 1146  6.26  42 
Jordan 1491  5.14  34 
Morocco 1388  5.44  36 
Syria 1209  6.03  40 
Tunisia 2283  3.37  23 
Djibouti 742  8.12  53 
Lebanon 2999  2.24  15 
Yemen 254  12.86  83 
Mauritania 478  10.04  65 
Comoros 403  10.79  70 
Sudan 296  12.17  79 
Arab Countries  1841  4.26  29 
Source: Own Calculation 
* The average annual growth rates of real per capita GDP required to achieve the target level of realer capita 
GDP of US$5224 within twenty-five years;  
** Number of years required to achieve the target level of real per capita GDP of US$5224 with the annual 
growth rate of 3.72 percent – the growth rates of per capita real GDP required to  reduce poverty by half by 2015   18 
Obviously the circumstances of Arab countries are unlikely to remain unchanged. In fact, 
these countries experienced significant changes in their recent past, some of which, including 
political and economic reforms, have been in part initiated by the countries themselves and 
are for the better. Others resulted from the dynamics of the international economy. 
Particularly important, in this respect, are the deepening globalisation and the information 
revolution.   
 
V. Investment: 
As noted in the introduction, one of the fundamental determinants of long-run growth, and 
hence internal sustainability, is investment. In this respect it is important to note that a 
number of Arab countries are known to have engineered an investment transition prior to the 
early 1980s. An investment transition is defined as a sustained increase in the investment rate 
(investment/GDP ratio) of five percentage points or more. To capture the concept of 
sustained increase “a country is said to undergo an investment transition in year T if the 
three-year moving average of its investment rate over an eight year period starting at T+1 
exceeds the five-year average of its investment rate prior to T by five percentage points or 
more”(Rodrik 1999: 58).  
 
Applying the above definition for a sample of developing countries, excluding major oil 
exporting countries as well as cases in which the post-transition investment rate remains 
below 10 percent, yielded 47 episodes of investment transitions. About 17 per cent of these 
transition episodes are for Arab countries. Table (10) reports the relevant results for the 8 
Arab countries involved. It should be noted that three of these transitions occurred prior to 
1973 period (Morocco, Somalia and Syria), two in 1973 (Egypt and Jordan), two in 1974 
(Mauritania and Tunisia) and one in 1975 (Yemen). 
 
Table (10): Arab Countries with Investment Transitions 
 
Country  Transition Year  Average Investment/GDP Ratio 
    5 years prior  5 years after 
Egypt   1973  0.130  0.290 
Jordan   1973  0.183  0.324 
Mauritania 1974  0.213  0.345 
Morocco 1969  0.113  0.178 
Somalia 1972 0.120  0.230 
Syria 1972  0.136  0.259 
Tunisia 1974 0.217  0.299 
Yemen 1975  0.176  0.355 
Source: Dani Rodrik (1999) 
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Investment transitions are known to be associated with significant increases in economic 
growth. In particular, it was shown that countries that experience an investment transition go 
from a growth rate which is 0.8 percentage points less than world average to one that is 1.4 
percentage points more than that average. The growth difference is a significant 2.2 
percentage points. As is well known, only a few Arab countries were able to preserve these 
growth gains in the wake of the external shocks of the early 1970s, and that in most Arab 
countries, the gains were eventually reversed while the investment rate remained high. Lower 
growth rates and high investment rates translate into relatively high incremental capital 
output ratios (or lower rates of return to capital) indicating inefficient use of capital. One 
possible explanation of the inability of Arab countries to preserve the growth gains 
contingent upon experiencing an investment transition is the absence of social institutions to 
resolve conflicts arising from external shocks. However, it is also a well documented, and 
robust, result in the literature evaluating first generation economic reforms that these policy 
packages have lead to a decline in investment rates (see, for example,  Elbadawi (1992)). 
 
To further probe the issue of the current state of the capitalisation of the region, and the 
behaviour of the investment rate following the external shocks of the early 1970s, we 
compiled the available information on investment rates over the period 1974-1998. For all 
sub-regions the investment rate has declined over the period (table (11)). In what follows we 
shall take the average investment rate for the period 1990-1998 as representing the initial 
conditions of the region.  
 
Table (11): Investment Rates in Arab Countries: 1974-1998:  (percentages) 
 
Region  1974-1980  1981-1990  1990-1998 
MOP*  44.0 33.3 28.8 
GCC  29.3 25.5 19.6 
DE  29.7 26.2 25.2 
PP*  20.3 24.3 18.5 
Simple Average   28.7  26.0  22.2 
S.  Deviation  8.88 4.56 4.75 
Source: World Bank (2000) 
*The corresponding figures stand only for one country 
 
The behaviour of the investment rate varied between groups and countries. While almost all 
of the country groups in the sample recorded a decline between the first period and the end 
period, the primary producers recorded an increase in the second period before recording a 
decline. At the country level, it was only Kuwait, out of the 12 countries in the sample, that 
recorded an increase in the investment rate. The other 11 countries registered a decline in the 
end period as compared to the first period. These include Algeria, for which the average 
investment rate declined from 44.0 per cent of GDP for the period 1974-1980 to 28.8 per cent 
for the period 1990-1998; Bahrain (from 46.1 per cent to 18.1 per cent); Oman (from 30.0 per 
cent to 16.6 per cent); Saudi Arabia (from 23.2 per cent to 20.7 per cent); United Arab   20 
Emirates (from 31.6 per cent to 23.1 per cent); Egypt (from 29.3 per cent to 19.4 per cent); 
Jordan (from 35.7 per cent to 31.2 per cent); Morocco (from 26.0 per cent to 22.1); Syria 
(from 28.3 per cent to 24.9 per cent); Tunisia ( from 29.2 per cent to 28.5); and Mauritania 
(from 20.3 per cent to 18.5 per cent).  
 
Given the above declining trends in investment rates, it may be important to note the required 
investment rates to achieve the international development goal of reducing poverty by half by 
the year 2015. Table (12) reports the required investment rates and compares them with the 




Table (12): Initial Investment Conditions and Required Investment Rates to Reduce 
Poverty by Half by 2015 
 
Country  Required GDP 
Growth Rate (%) 




Algeria  5.18  3.28 17.00 28.8 
Egypt  6.02  5.34 32.14 19.4 
Jordan  6.45  2.53 16.30 31.2 
Mauritania  8.35  9.06 75.57 18.5 
Morocco  5.83  2.27 13.20 22.1 
Tunisia  5.88  2.66 15.64 28.5 
Yemen  8.33  4.41 36.76 20.5 
Arab  Countries  5.70  3.64 20.78 23.7 
Source: Own Computation 
*Incremental capital output ratio 
**Average of the period 1990-1998. 
 
Different sub-regions have different investment requirements According to the results 
reported in table (12) the required investment to enable a GDP growth rate of 6 percent per 
annum for the whole region would be about 21 per cent of GDP. This needs to be compared 
with the reported initial investment rate of 23.7 per cent of GDP as the region enters the 21
st 
century. Although the region as a whole is in the fortunate position of having an initial 
investment rate (23.7%) in excess of that required rate of investment (20.8%) to achieve a 
GDP growth rate of 5.7 per cent, three countries out of seven: Egypt, Mauritania and Yemen 
have initial investment rates that fall short of the investment rates required to reduce poverty 
by half by the year 2015. 
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VI. Institutions: 
It is generally acceptable that development is brought about in the context of developmentally 
oriented societies. A recent consensus seems to have emerged on the major features of an 
ideal growth and development society. Such a society is seen as one which: (a) would know 
how to operate, manage, and build the instruments of production and to create, adapt and 
master new techniques on the technological frontier; (b) would be able to impart this know-
how to the youth by formal education or by apprenticeship; (c) would employ, promote and 
demote workers on the basis of competence and relative merit; (d) would afford opportunity 
to individuals or collective enterprise and encourage initiative, competition and emulation 
(see Landes (1998)). Such ideal societies are said to have social and political institutions that 
would secure rights of private property and personal liberty; enforce contracts; provide stable, 
responsive, honest, transparent and accountable governments; allow for social and geographic 
mobility; and evolve a more equal distribution of income supporting a large middle class. 
Thus the above definition makes it very clear that institutions are central to the ideal growth 
and development societies. 
 
According to North (1990: 3-5) institutions “are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence 
they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. 
Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to 
understanding historical change”. According to this understanding institutions include any 
form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction. These constraints 
could be formal (such as the rules devised by human beings) or informal (such as conventions 
or codes or customs). Institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on 
the costs of exchange and production. In addition to North’s institutional and historical 
approach, a recent strand of empirical growth literature has found strong, and robust, support 
for the centrality of institutions in explaining differences in performance between countries 
(see, for example, Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000)).   
 
In the recent empirical literature “institutions” are looked at in terms of a number of measures 
reported by the Political Risk Services Group (PRS) which constructs the famous 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The ICRG risk rating system assigns a numerical 
value (called risk points) to a predetermined range of risk components according to a preset 
weighted scale for each country. Each scale is designed to award the highest value to the 
lowest risk and the lowest value to the highest risk.  
 
The most important measures of the quality of institutions, frequently used in the empirical 
literature, are the “government repudiation of contracts” (scored from zero to ten, it is a 
measure of the risk of a government modifying a contract by repudiating, postponing, or 
scaling it down due to budget cuts, domestic pressures, change in government, or a change in 
domestic circumstances and priorities); “expropriation” (scored from zero to ten, it is a 
measure of the risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization); “corruption” (scored 
from zero to six, it is  a measure of the degree of corruption by high government officials in 
terms of demanding special payments for discharging their official duties and in terms of 
illegal payments at lower levels of government); the “rule of law” (scored from zero to six, it   22 
is a measure of the extent to which there are sound political institutions, strong court systems 
and orderly succession of power); and the “quality of the bureaucracy” (scored from zero to 
six, it is a measure of the degree of autonomy of the civil service from political pressures, 
government policy continuity and the fairness of the recruitment process to civil service 
positions). ERF (1998) reported the relevant country scores for a sample of 15 Arab countries 
covered by PRS. Table (13) reports these scores for 1985 and 1997. In the table an increase in 
the score indicates an improvement in the institutional structure.  
 
Table (13): Indicators of Institutions in a Sample of Arab Countries: 1985 and 1997 
 
Country  Government 
Repudiation 
(out of 10 
points): 
1985    1997 
Expropriation 
(out of 10 
points): 
 
1985     1997 
Corruption 
(out of 6 
points): 
 
1985    1997 
Rule of Law 
(out of 6 
points): 
 
1985   1997 
Quality of 
Bureaucracy (out 
of 6 points): 
 
1985    1997 
Algeria  5.5        9  5           10  4          3  2         3  2          2 
Bahrain  6           9  7           10  3          3  4         5  4          3 
Egypt  5           9  5           10  2          2  3         4  3          3 
Iraq  2           8  2             6  1          5  3         5  4          5 
Jordan  4           8  5           10  3          4  2         4  3          4 
Kuwait  5           8  6           10  3          3  3         6  3          3 
Lebanon  3           9  4           10  3          1  1         4  2          2 
Libya  3           9  3             9  3          4  5         3  3          3 
Morocco  4           9  6             9  2          3  2         6  4          3 
Oman  6           9  6             9  3          3  3         5  3          4 
Qatar  2           8  7             9  2          2  3         6  2          3 
S. Arabia  3           8  6           10  3          2  4         5  4          3 
Syria  4           8  4             9  2          4  2         5  2          3 
UAE  3           8  6             9  2          2  3         4  3          3 
Yemen  5           9  5           10  2          3  1         4  1          3 
Maximum*  6(2)      9(8)  7(2)      10(8)  4(1)     5(1)  5(1)     6(3)  4(4)     5(1) 
Minimum*  2(2)      8(7)  2(1)        6(1)  1(1)     1(1)  1(2)     3(2)  1(1)     2(2) 
Source: ERF (1998:54; table 12.2). * Figures between brackets are number of countries. 
 
A general remark on the above results is that for all indicators of institutional quality the Arab 
countries have recorded impressive progress over the period under consideration. Indeed by 
1997 the “expropriation” category seems to be fast disappearing as a concern in this sample 
of countries. Except for Iraq where such a risk continues to be relatively high, all other 
countries reached the stage of minimal risk where 8 countries reached the maximum score 
while another 6 scored 9 points out of the maximum of 10 points for a minimum risk.   23 
Similarly, the risk of governments repudiating their contracts in the Arab countries seems to 
be disappointing where 8 countries recorded a score of 9, one point short of the minimum risk 
score, and another 7 countries scoring 8, only two points short of the minimum risk status.  
 
Corruption, the rule of law and the quality of the bureaucracy remain the major institutional 
problems for the Arab countries. As can be seen from the table by 1997 only four countries 
scored above the average corruption score of 3 (Iraq, Jordan, Libya and Syria). A slight 
improvement is recorded for the rule of law where three countries  have scored the minimum 
risk, or the maximum score of 6 points, (Kuwait, Morocco and Qatar). Similarly, the quality 
of the Arab bureaucracy leaves a lot to be desired. Only Iraq is reported to have a fairly high 
quality of administration.  
 
Similar to the above rather mixed picture of the state of institutional structure, the Arab world 
enters the 21
st century with a mixed political mould. A summary of the governance situation 
is detailed in table (14) using the indicators of political freedom constructed by Freedom 
House (1999). The table shows the country scores on measures of political rights, civil 
liberties and the average score of the two, and the classification of the country as to its 
freedom status (free, partly free and not free). These measures are derived from the Freedom 
of the World survey produced by Freedom House. Scores between 1 (for free) and 7 (not 
free) are assigned to the categories of political rights and civil liberties. 
 
The political rights category measures the extent to which the government is chosen by 
means of free and fair elections of candidates. A checklist of 8 questions relating to standard 
norms of political freedom informs the scoring of this category. In addition, two questions are 
added to account for special circumstances of traditional monarchies and to account for 
safeguards for ethnic minorities. Thus, for example, for countries with a score of 7, “political 
rights are absent or virtually non-existent due to the extremely oppressive nature of the 
regime or severe oppression in combination with civil war”. 
 
The civil liberties score essentially measures freedom from government oppression, 
encompassing the strength and objectivity of the rule of law as well as personal freedoms, 
such as those of expression and religion. A checklist of 14 questions relating to standard 
norms of civil liberties informs the scoring of this category. These questions are classified 
into four broad categories of “freedom of expression and belief”, “association and 
organisation rights”, “rule of law and human rights”, and “personal autonomy and economic 
rights”. In rating countries on the basis of the checklist on civil liberties, it is those rights 
enjoyed in practice that are used instead of the constitutional guarantees of such rights. Thus, 
countries rated 7 have virtually no freedom and an overwhelming and justified fear of 
repression characterises them as societies. Averaging the two scores for political rights and 
civil liberties gives the score for freedom. Countries are given the status of “free” if the 
average score lies in the range 1-2.5; the status of “partly free” is given to scores falling in the 
range 2.5-5.5 while the status “not free” is given to scores in the range 5.5-7. 
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This methodology has been applied for a long period of time (since the 1970s) and Freedom 
House indices are used quite frequently in rigorous analysis. However, individual countries 
may have reservations about the status assigned to them and as such can contest the 
methodology adopted. While not necessarily subscribing to the methodology or the way it is 
applied, we believe that it enables a fairly objective way of assessing the initial political 
conditions in the region as it enters the 21
st century. 
 
Given the above understanding, the picture painted by the results reported by Freedom House 
is one that calls for cautious optimism. On a global scale Arab countries tend to be the least 
free in the world, with authoritarian regimes still common and democracy still nascent. In this 
respect it is worth noting that it was only Djibouti that classified as “free” only in the 1970s.  
In the 1980s and 1990s none of the Arab countries was “free”. Furthermore, in the 1970s and 
1990s the Arab region as a whole was “not free” though it was “partially free” in the 1980s 
with a freedom status index of 5.44 and a standard deviation of 0.75.  
 
On a sub-regional basis, the results show the Diversified Economies (DE) as the most free 
through out 1972-2000 period. In fact this sub-region was “not free” only in the 1990s 
otherwise “partially free” for the rest period of the three decades. In contrast the rest of the 
sub-regions: MOP, GCC and PP were classified as “not free” for the three decades of the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Table (14):  Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Arab Countries:1972-2000 
 
Status  1972-1979  1980-1989  1990-2000  1999/2000 
Free  1  0  0  0 
Partially Free  9  12  7  11 
Not Free  11  9  14  10 
Number of Countries  21  21  21  21 
Arab Countries (Weighted Average)  Not Free [5.58]  Partially Free [5.44]  Not Free [6.01]  Not Free [5.94] 
S. Deviation  1.13  0.75  0.91  0.94 
Source: Freedom House (1999) 
 
 
From the above we note that the Arab world enters the 21
st century with a freedom score of 
5.94. Ten countries, with 55.6 per cent of the population of the region, are classified as “not 
free”, while the remainder with 44.4 per cent of the Arab population are classified as “partly 
free”. Thus, developing political institutions that conform to international standards of 
freedom will remain a challenge for the internal sustainability of the Arab world.  
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VII. Technological Capacity: 
As noted in the introduction the long-run sustainability of nations as defined in the context of 
ideal growth and development societies is contingent on their abilities to be in the frontier of 
science and technology. According to a recent survey of opinion among active scientists 
Kaku (1998) shows that the 21
st century will be shaped by   science and technology. Three 
interrelated scientific revolutions are identified as having informed the technological 
advances of the 20
th century: these are the quantum revolution, the computing revolution and 
the bio-molecular revolution. The recently celebrated gnome project success is but one 
example of what to come in the 21
st century. Such advances are expected to dramatically 
change the nature of societies and economies of the new century.  
 
The scientific and technological capacity of nations is currently measured by a number of 
indicators. According to the latest World Science Report produced by UNESCO (1998a: 22-
30), such indicators include total expenditure on research and development (R&D), science 
and technology personnel, scientific publications and registered patents.  
According to the latest available information, gross domestic expenditure on R&D in the 
world amounted to US$470 billion in 1994. R&D expenditure by the Arab countries is 
estimated as US$ 1.9 billion, only 0.4% of total world expenditure. Not surprisingly,  84% 
R&D expenditure is contributed by advanced countries: North America (37.9 per cent), 
Western Europe (28 per cent) and Japan and the newly industrialised countries (18.6 per 
cent). 
 
Table (15): Scientific and Technological Capacities in World Regions 
(1995: percentages of total) 
 







Western Europe  28.0  35.8  47.4  19.9 
North America  37.9  38.4  33.4  51.1 
Latin America  1.9  1.6  0.2  0.2 
Arab States  0.4  0.7  0.0  0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.5  0.8  0.2  0.1 
Japan and NICS  18.6  10.1  16.6  27.3 
China 4.9  1.6  0.1  0.2 
India and Central Asia  2.2  2.1  0.0  0.0 
Others 2.2  2.9  1.3  0.6 
World 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: UNESCO (1998a: 23-26). * Figures are for 1994.  
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The number of articles published in scientific journals conventionally measures scientific 
output and activity. Data from the Science Citation Index, which provides systematic 
coverage of the articles published in 2500 of the most cited and influential journals, is used 
for this purpose. According to the latest information, the maximum share of Africa in this 
output was only 1.5 per cent of total scientific publications in 1995, inclusive of the share of 
all Arab states. Sub-Saharan Africa contributed 0.8 per cent of the total scientific output in 
the world. As with gross domestic expenditure on R&D, the world scientific output is 
concentrated in North America (38.4 per cent), Western Europe (35.8 per cent), and Japan 
and newly industrialized countries (10.1 per cent).  
 
The number of patents published by patent offices is used as a measure of the technological 
capability at the frontier of knowledge. Despite recognising the limitation of using patents 
published by the two biggest and most recognized patent systems in the world, UNESCO 
reports such indicators by world region. The latest available information on this indicator 
shows that Africa’s share in 1995 was only 0.2 per cent in European patents and only 0.1 per 
cent in US patents. As would be expected, Western Europe dominates the European patent 
system with a share of 47.4 per cent, followed by the USA (a share of 33.4 per cent) and 
Japan and newly industrialized countries (16.6 per cent). Similarly, the USA dominates the 
US patent system with a share of 51.5 per cent, followed by Japan and newly industrialized 
countries (with a share of 27.3 per cent) and Western Europe (19.9 per cent).  
 
Thus, based on the above it is fair to conclude that the Arab world faces a major sustainability 
constraint relating to technological capacity. Possible ways of going about relaxing this 
constraint have recently been addressed by, among others, Fergany (2000).    
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks: 
Taking its cue from modern empirical growth literature this paper has identified a number of 
variables as of crucial importance for the internal sustainability and growth potential of the 
Arab countries. At the outset it acknowledges the diversity of this group of countries 
cautioning against making sweeping generalizations. To conduct the analysis four sub-groups 
are identified following the classification adopted by the Economic Research Forum.  
 
To situate the analysis in its proper context it is noted that despite its oil wealth, and its share 
in the total population of the world, the Arab countries can be considered as a marginal 
economic grouping in the global context. It produces about x% of the world’s output. Indeed 
it is shown that the largest five multinational companies in the world produce goods and 
services more than that produced by all the Arab countries combined. This, we suggest, is an 
important observation for a sober realization of the overall context.  
 
Of the various factors determining long-run performance of countries, it is argued that the 
Arab countries are relatively well positioned regarding the distribution of income,  the 
incidence of poverty, and human development. Perhaps political commitment, cultural values   27 
and a wealth effect are behind this favourable initial condition for future sustainability and 
growth. Similarly, it is shown that the Arab countries are well positioned regarding 
investment rates. A number of them have been able to effect an investment transition in the 
past and there is no reason why all of them should do so in the future.  
 
Given the definition of an ideal growth and development society, and given the scientific and 
technological nature of the twenty first century, however, it is shown that the Arab countries 
lack conspicuously in the areas of institutions and technological capacity. These, together 
with a currently distorted production structure, present Arab policy makers with major 
challenges for the future.       28 
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